Wednesday, March 24, 2010

global political economy

Are you accomplices in the current folly of the nations -- the folly of wanting above all to produce as much as possible and to become as rich as possible? What you ought to do, rather, is to hold up to the the counter-reckoning: how great a sum of inner value is thrown away in pursuit of this external goal! But where is your inner value if you no longer know what it is to breathe freely? if you no longer possess the slightest power over yourselves? if you all too often grow weary of yourselves like a drink that has been left too long standing? if you pay heed to the newspapers and look askance at your wealthy neighbor, made covetous by the rapid rise and fall of power, money and opinions? if you no longer believe in philosophy that wears rags, in the free heartedness of him without needs? if voluntary poverty and freedom from profession and marriage, such as would very well suit the more spiritual among you, have become to you things to laugh at? If, on the other hand, you have always in your ears the flutings of the Socialist pied-pipers whose design is to enflame you with wild hopes? which bid you to be prepared and nothing further, prepared day upon day, so that you wait and wait for something to happen from outside and in all other respects go on living as you have always lived -- until this waiting turns to hunger and thirst and fever and madness, and at last the day of the bestia trumphans dawns in its glory? -- Daybreak, F. Nietzsche


Stratfor Global Intelligence offers their members insights into global happenings. Their website states "members include individuals, FORTUNE 100 corporations, government agencies and other organizations around the world" -- heavy hitters in the global game. Yves Smith put a few paragraphs of Stratfor's thinking in a recent piece which is very much worth reading. Stratfor says:

One of the leading reasons the world has been so stable is because the traditional merchant powers have had a deep market to sell into: the United States. Part of the peace accords and reconstruction of Japan included granting it full access to the U.S. market as well as full American protection of Japanese trade lines. Part of the peace accords and reconstruction of Germany included a similar arrangement. These arrangements proved so successful in containing Japanese and German imperial ambitions, revitalizing and enriching their economies, and giving them a powerful incentive to be part of the U.S. alliance structure that the pattern was repeated throughout Western Europe, in Taiwan and Korea, and to a lesser degree in Indonesia and elsewhere.

By granting these states privileged access to the American market — and not necessarily demanding American access to their markets in return — the United States created conditions extremely favorable for its allies’ economic development and prosperity. “All” it asked for in return was the right to determine military strategy, ultimately creating a global alliance network that served American interests. The United States traded some market share to turn adversaries into allies, both reducing the number of foes and intimidating the remainder by the sheer size of the U.S. alliance structure. As a result, some of the world’s most aggressive mercantile powers became placid. They no longer had to go to war for access to resources or markets.

This entire arrangement, however, rested on the basis that the United States generally did not use the full force of its state power in pursuit of its singular economic ends. The United States was content to buy others’ goods and run trade deficits to command the loyalty of its allies in security matters. The question with the Obama administration’s export strategy is whether it marks a change from this mode. To increase exports, one has to increase penetration into foreign economies, and a number of countries’ economies and social systems only work the way they do because they have taken shape with minimal outside pressure — i.e., minimal competition from the United States. This is not to say that many countries do not already perceive the U.S. presence as overbearing, but rather that the United States simply has not spent much energy in competing for foreign market share over the past half century. If it suddenly exerts itself in opening up the doors of trade around the world — and doubling U.S. exports would mean finding buyers for an additional $1.5 trillion dollars worth of goods — it will disrupt a lot of places.

We are not saying that the Obama administration’s export strategy is good, bad, wise, unwise, feasible, unfeasible or anything else. It simply raises the question of whether it is a coincidence that when the dominant global power did not use state power to seek foreign markets, the degree of competition and ultimately violence among players on the international stage was markedly lower than in previous periods. If not a coincidence, then the full weight of the American nation behind a strategy of maximizing exports could have massive unintended consequences.


Now, Stratfor could very much be talking their book here. If they get most of their money from Fortune 100 companies, no one is going to be hurt more if the planet's nations go into a full scale trade war, though few tears will be shed for the Fortune 100. However, there's two important points here I've been harping on for an extended time. First, the world is not going to export and devalue their way out of the financial mess.

The second point is more important. The financial crisis is at root a symptom of the increasingly unstable post-WWII Pax Americana. The United States, the world's greatest debtor, can no longer play the role we've played in global political economy for the past seventy years. We must begin to consume less, produce more of what we consume, transcend our oil addiction, and close the military-bases we have around the globe, cutting the military budget by at least half. That's necessary economic reform for America.

Now this transition is going to take years and it has already begun. It will be a challenge not just for the United States, but for the world, and no matter how challenging it becomes, if we can avoid more wars, the earth will come out ahead. To understand just how tricky this is going to be lets look at the Euro. The creation of the Euro was a direct and healthy challenge to the Pax Americana, however only 15 years old, the Euro is facing an existential crisis. As worries on the Euro grow, we see much of the world retreat to the safe-haven of the dollar, making amongst other things, US export plans problematic. But the problem of the Euro is very much the problem of the dollar, and the problem of the dollar is very much the problem of the renminbi. That is, we are all in this together. Tremendous imbalances in the global economy have risen over the past several decades, they will take years to work out. The thinking and people that brought the world here, are not going to be the people and thinking that get us out.

5 comments:

  1. "[...] is very much the problem of the renminbi. That is, we are all in this together."

    I don't think so. Not necessarily. If people wholly feel themselves to be "in this together," then they may act like it, but it's certainly a fallacy to present it as a kind of objective feature of the universe locally to our little globe here. Certainly it's a sweet sentiment which is contradicted immediately by any sense of realpolitik. Suppose the Chinese decouple effectively from the US economy and make energy arrangements with Russia, effectively eliminating the possibility of energy-blockade induced disaster at the hands of the Pentagon: what then? They don't need us. They can consume internally and with Russia and any others in the region and watch our hegemony melt down, as the Pentagon is drawn back into the continental 48 to crush chaos. That's realpolitik, not childish kumbaya. It's certainly ironic entertainment watching the Anglo-American oligarchs (cutthroat financial/intelligence entities) roll out the kumbaya (all in it together) hippy meme now that they have premonition of the end of their unilateral dominance, but you needn't subscribe to it.
    Other than that minor quibble (mostly a response to an Ian Bremmer meme still oscillating in my head from March29s FT (the sense of panic and desperation in his Op-Ed was palpable)) I wholly endorse your views in this post and the others I've read in the last 20 minutes. (linked from naked capitalism)

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  2. lets just not have wars as world power shuffles, my only sentiment there, and we'd all come out better off.

    Certainly the Chinese could cut deal with Russians, but it wouldn't be enough oil to do much for 1.2 billion people, frankly I think the Chinese have been sold a bill of goods buying into the American development model, just impossible for them, the biggest reason, there isn't enough oil.

    peace

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  3. On your first point, no contest.

    On the second point, as per the Russia/China (SCO) hypothetical, I'm sure the Chinese would have to cut gasoline consumption (figuring supplies from the Mideast interdicted) but could _survive_ without imploding, given sufficient natural gas imports from Russia, rice (if necessary) from Vietnam etc. Their industries would not meltdown and their infrastructure would continue to expand into the hinterlands as the leadership reallocated excess labor resources away from the exporting of Walmart trinkets.

    A key point is that China doesn't need oil (at least not in the way that the US needs oil), they need energy. Energy can come in many forms, coal, natural gas, nuclear... It is precisely the American development model that they are _not_ following. (they have made massive investments in high speed trains for example). Their logistical infrastructure is not nearly so reliant on gasoline/diesel as is the American. Without the trucks moving on the interstates we would indeed have serious problems. The Chinese have a built some few showcase American style suburban sprawl communities, but it would be a mistake to imagine that their society operates this way as a whole. THere is really no such simple comparison.

    The implication is that 'we' (actually, the oligarch magnates of AngloAmerican financial/intelligence power) haven't really got anything to threaten China with if 'decoupling' is deemed successful. This is Ian Bremmer's tell.

    They can dump the dollar holdings and withstand a five year winter whilst we have total meltdown and turn into Uganda. After that the world is a much simpler proposition for them, provided no Rapture cult takes up residence in NORAD during our civil upheavals.

    See Ian Bremmer's other links on the web, ie Amazon books and "Eurasia" political consulting group. This is very much the corporate vs the state. The oligarchs wanted to melt the states down and run the world as elite bankers through corporate entities. Engdahl called it a "bridge too far." If the Chinese leadership doesn't want to play along, it's over. Perhaps something like this is what is in the cards. Chinese and Russian (and smaller players) states against a non-state aggregation of corporate players hailing from the mid-Atlantic. Very interesting.

    A more careful analysis is indicated, but I'll leave it like this for now.

    One final qualification. I obviously really don't know how much oil (gasoline, diesel) China 'needs', under diverse scenarios. I would imagine that this subject is intensely researched in China and elsewhere. Anyone who claims to have a simple answer to this critical question is either confused or lying. Saying that China presently consumes X oil and is on track to consume X2 by 2020 is not sufficient evidence to conclude that failing to procure such amounts implies GDP losses of Y and Y2... lazy casuistry which would fail to account for the full range of scenarios in adaptation.

    ...continued

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  4. ...pt2


    I don't know the answer, but I am confident that it's complicated. Come to think of it, even the much more clearcut American example is more complicated than realized by the policy makers. It's precisely this lack of imagination in terms of realizing and mapping the field of possible reconfigurations in the American infrastructure and economy (to wit: "transcending its dependence on oil") which has lead so many in the American foreign policy leadership to conclude that conquest of the Middle East and other oil bearing regions was compulsory. I'm not sure it was or is. Clearly you need some oil, and therefore will require some agency of power in regions of interest, but how much? Is it within the realm of possibility to construct an advanced technology industrial society/economy without much in the way of gasoline/diesel? Ask the Japanese. I would think their answer is yes, it can/could be done. It would be interesting to see their contingency planning for oil scarcity, (with all other imports unnaffected). The heavily endorsed ideas that all wealth & power in a society could be reduced to a fossil fuel importation chart was a Kissinger/Brez/geopolitical-wanker wet dream, typical oversimplification of something exceedingly complicated (the possibility space or configuration space of economies) into a trite little model that could be easily explained on powerpoint to General Ripper on the big board. Most macro is like this, children playing Risk on a big board.

    The oil-reductionism had more credence in the 60's and 70's, when the interstates were just coming into their own, just-in-time logistics being developed and air travel exploding. Even then it was lazy thinking, but at least convincing given conditions at the time.

    Another tangentially related note: I'm no longer convinced of the reality of an oil-scarcity, peak oil. Engdahl again, claims the likelihood of an industry originated misinfo on that whole idea, simply to jack prices. There is no way to verify any of it, all the exploration and geophysical data is so proprietary and owned by interested parties.

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  5. Apropos the Krugman thread, here another example of lazy and mediocre thinking cloaked in professional grade format. Many thousands of words of droning over the same 3 or 4 points, complete with footnotes and impressive mathematical formulae! The objective seems to be to impress by sheer mass of boredom. The link:
    http://www.wsichina.org//curr03.html

    Contentwise, their big sin is failure to grasp the full complexity of the oil-dependence issue in economic terms, which really transcends the field of contemporary economics and needs to account for diverse factors including infrastructural/sociological relationships; concrete example (among many), how do/will/would (under a range of considered scenarios) the Chinese grow and then transport food to market? If they use diesel trucks now would they somewhat switch to cargo bicycle for the last 5 klicks from freight rail...? At no loss to 'GDP'? (GDP: a bullshit statistic in the first place)
    Similar reassessments are long overdue wrt to the economy/society/infrastructure of the United States. The groupthink and mediocrity has prevented it, rather than practical limitations in the field of possibilities.

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